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Short title: Psychology of cooperation in humans and primates 
 
Abstract 
In any given species, cooperation involves prosocial acts that usually return a 
fitness benefit to the actor. These acts are produced by a set of psychological rules, 
which will be similar in related species if they have a similar natural history of 
cooperation. Prosocial acts can be (i) reactive, i.e. in response to specific stimuli, or 
(ii) proactive, i.e. occur in the absence of such stimuli. We propose that reactive 
prosocial acts reflect sensitivity to (a) signals or signs of need and (b) the presence 
and size of an audience, as modified by (c) social distance to the partner or partners. 
We examine the evidence for these elements in humans and other animals, especially 
non-human primates, based on the natural history of cooperation, quantified in the 
context of food sharing, and various experimental paradigms. The comparison 
suggests that humans share with their closest living relatives reactive responses to 
signals of need, but differ in sensitivity to signs of need and cues of being watched, as 
well as in the presence of proactive prosociality. We discuss ultimate explanations for 
these derived features, in particular the adoption of cooperative breeding as well as 
concern for reputation and costly signalling during human evolution. 
 
Keywords: cooperative breeding, costly signalling, food sharing, other-regarding 
preferences, reciprocal altruism, reputation 
 
Introduction 
Cooperative and altruistic behaviours can be favoured by natural selection if 
they increase the inclusive fitness of the actor (see Lehmann & Rousset, this volume, 
Brosnan & Bshary, this volume). The conditions under which this is the case are now 
well known (ibid.). However, which proximate mechanisms make an actor engage in 
such behaviours is less well understood. Here we focus on the prosocial acts, i.e. acts 
of help or assistance to others (Silk 2007), which together constitute cooperative and 
altruistic behaviour as defined by Brosnan and Bshary (this volume). We propose that 
these acts are regulated by a set of psychological rules (henceforth: rules) that on 
average produce fitness-increasing behaviour. For instance, the rule to adjust 
prosocial acts to the recipient’s need and preferentially directing them towards 
partners that reciprocated in the past is generally adaptive, because it maximises the 
return benefits through reciprocity (Trivers 1971), whatever exact cognitive or 
emotional mechanisms underlie it. 
The idea that behaviour is produced by a set of rules follows the tradition of 
classical ethologists, who attempted to identify the corresponding intrinsic 
motivations and responses to extrinsic stimuli (Tinbergen 1951). In Figure 1, the 
intrinsic motivation is indicated by the intercept b, whereas the tendency to respond to 
extrinsic stimuli is indicated by the slope of the response a. Because natural selection 
works by modifying these rules over time, it is parsimonious to assume that they are 
similar in closely related species due to homology (de Waal 1991). Specifically, this 
view implies that humans and great apes are likely to have a similar psychology 
underlying prosocial acts. However, the psychology may change when one taxon 
evolves a different style of cooperation from that of its sister group, as we will argue 
for humans and great apes, which could lead to convergent evolution with other taxa 
that evolved similar patterns of cooperation. Thus, the goal of this paper is to examine 
the psychological rules underlying prosocial behaviour in humans, based on natural 
history and experimental evidence, and to compare them with those of other primates, 
and in particular our closest living relatives, the great apes. The potential 
endocrinological correlates of these rules are discussed elsewhere (Soares et al. this 
volume). We identify features in which humans generally differ from other animals 
and discuss hypotheses explaining the evolution of these features. (For the purpose of 
this chapter we ignore the large intraspecific variation documented in humans with 
respect to cooperative and anti-social behaviour (Gächter et al. this volume).) 
(insert Figure 1 about here) 
The natural history of cooperation 
Human foragers, whose ecology and social organisation are probably closest 
to the conditions under which our psychology evolved (Tooby & Cosmides 2005), 
systematically and frequently engage in various forms of cooperation. Thus, common 
prosocial acts include voluntary food sharing both with kin and non-kin, allo-maternal 
child care, division of labour, care for the sick, injured and elderly, information 
donation (teaching), cooperative hunting, collective warfare, etc. (Burkart & van 
Schaik 2010; Gurven 2004; Gurven & Hill 2009; Hrdy 2009; Kaplan & Gurven 2005; 
Kaplan et al. 2009; Marlowe 2007). Prosocial acts occur within family units, 
including pair-bonded partners and their offspring, and also among family units 
within local groups. Their pervasiveness suggests that they return high fitness benefits 
to actors. 
Among great apes, cooperation is less common and prosocial acts are less 
pervasive (see also Melis & Semmann, this volume). Food sharing is generally 
reluctant and rarely active, even among kin (Figure 2, discussed in detail below), there 
is little evidence for teaching (reviewed by Humle et al. 2009; Jaeggi et al. 2010a) and 
allo-maternal child care is virtually absent, as is care for the disabled beyond 
grooming (Hrdy 2009; van Schaik & Burkart 2010). Among chimpanzees, the most 
common forms of cooperation involve closely bonded males, such as in mutual 
support in conflicts (Gilby et al. 2009; Watts 2002), cooperative hunting (Boesch 
1994; Boesch & Boesch 1989; Watts & Mitani 2002) and inter-community warfare 
(Manson & Wrangham 1991). This indicates that prosocial acts among great apes on 
average yield lower fitness benefits to actors, with the possible exception of 
chimpanzee males, who seem to profit more from cooperation. Probably this is due to 
the relatively low average relatedness of chimpanzees and the resulting reliance on 
direct reciprocity for many aspects of cooperation (Langergraber et al. 2007; 
Langergraber et al. 2009), as well as the absence of strong pair-bonds.  
Species other than great apes show more parallels with humans with respect to 
the natural history of cooperation. In particular, voluntary food sharing, teaching, allo-
maternal care and care for the injured are more common in cooperative breeders such 
as callitrichid monkeys or social carnivores (Brotherton et al. 2001; Burkart & van 
Schaik 2010; Clutton-Brock et al. 2001; Hrdy 2009; Kühme 1965; MacDonald & 
Sillero-Zubiri 2004; Thornton & Raihani 2008). This indicates that cooperative 
breeders enjoy higher return benefits from prosocial acts and are more prone to 
engage in them. Could this similarity with humans reflect convergent evolution? 
Humans can also be called cooperative breeders, since they show high levels 
of infant care by older siblings, husbands, and grandmothers (reviewed by van Schaik 
& Burkart 2010). In contrast, great ape females are independent breeders who receive 
no help in rearing their young (Hrdy 2009). While most great apes, and in particular 
females with offspring, are relatively solitary in order to avoid feeding competition 
(Stumpf 2007; van Schaik 1999), cooperative breeders typically form family groups, 
including at least one bonded pair and multiple offspring, both dependent and 
independent (Chapais 2008; Clutton-Brock 2002). Within this expanded kin network, 
prosocial acts should be under more positive selection and the underlying psychology 
could change accordingly. Thus, the Cooperative Breeding Hypothesis states that 
some convergent evolution between humans and other cooperative breeders explains 
the emergence of psychological and cognitive features in humans not shared by the 
other apes (Burkart et al. 2009; Burkart & van Schaik 2010; Hrdy 2009). 
Humans may also differ from chimpanzees in two other important aspects of 
cooperation. Firstly, there is substantial interdependence among foragers, because the 
returns from individual foraging are smaller than the ones from cooperative foraging 
and hunting returns are large but so unpredictable that sharing became a survival 
necessity (Kaplan et al. 2009). Thus, a solitary human forager, in stark contrast to a 
solitary chimpanzee, is always worse off than a cooperative forager. Furthermore, the 
fission-fusion dynamics of foragers allow for considerable partner choice, thus 
restraining selfish tendencies due to the risk of losing valuable cooperation partners 
(ibid.). These two aspects combined caused the necessity to establish and maintain a 
cooperative reputation. Thus, non-cooperative individuals may face substantial costs 
imposed by the “moral community” (Boehm 1999) ranging from shunning over overt 
accusations to ostracism and violence (Boehm 1999; Gurven 2004; Marlowe 2009). 
These potentially high costs exerted by others on cheaters probably led to a hyper-
awareness of the risk of being detected, i.e. a conscience (DeScioli & Kurzban 2009; 
Trivers 1971), functioning to anticipate others’ reactions and thus avoid these costs. 
Combined with large group sizes and the possibility to spread reputations through 
language as gossip in a fission-fusion society (Dunbar 2004), concern for reputation 
should thus have lead to an increased sensitivity to being watched by others. 
Secondly, individuals, and in particular men, may signal cooperative tendencies and 
their own qualities to large audiences in order to increase their chances of being 
chosen as cooperation partners or mates (Smith & Bliege Bird 2005). Thus, costly 
signalling theory also predicts sensitivity to the presence and size of an audience, in 
order to maximize the broadcasting efficiency of costly signals. 
Hence, some aspects of human cooperation are probably homologous with our 
closest relatives, in particular with regard to mutualism and direct reciprocity 
(hunting, warfare, agonistic support) whereas others are better explained by 
convergence with cooperative breeders, probably due to increased kin networks and 
strong pair-bonds, and yet others are probably uniquely derived, viz. concern for 
reputation and the broadcasting of prosocial acts to large audiences. These aspects of 
the natural history of cooperation are likely to affect the psychological rules 
regulating prosocial acts. 
Psychological rules underlying prosociality  
 As indicated in Figure 1, we propose that prosocial behaviour can be reactive, 
i.e. triggered by extrinsic stimuli (with a positive slope a); or proactive, i.e. in the 
absence of any obvious extrinsic stimuli, indicated by the intrinsic motivation b. Note 
that common definitions of altruism in other fields, such as in psychology (Batson 
1991) or philosophy (Kitcher 1998) mainly refer to proactive prosociality and may not 
consider prosocial behaviour in response to explicit stimuli altruistic. 
 In general, the steepness of the response (a) will have been moulded by natural 
selection according to the average probability of return benefits to the actor. As both 
kin selection and reciprocity theory predict that prosocial acts should be adjusted to 
the recipient’s need in order to achieve the greatest potential benefit (Hamilton 1964; 
Trivers 1971), actors should be sensitive to signals or signs of need. Note that 
responding to signals of need usually requires no special abilities, because they are 
directed at the actor and have specifically evolved in a form that most successfully 
elicited the desired response (Zahavi 1987). However, the ability to correctly read 
signs of need (not directed to actor) may often depend on theory-of-mind capacities. 
Thus, actors with a well-developed theory of mind may be better at perceiving 
adequate situations for prosocial acts which should lead to a steeper slope a. 
Furthermore, the importance of maintaining a cooperative reputation and the 
opportunities for costly signalling predict that actors should be sensitive to the 
(perceived) presence and size of an audience (DeScioli & Kurzban 2009; Smith & 
Bliege Bird 2005; Trivers 1971); Earley, this volume). Hence, an increase in either 
perceived need and/or perceived signalling opportunities (along the x-axis of Figure 
1) should lead to increased prosocial behaviour. Finally, the social distance to the 
recipient should function as a modifier of the prosocial response. Thus, all other 
things being equal (same x-value), close kin and reciprocating partners (friends) 
should elicit a higher prosocial response, because the average return benefit to the 
actor is greater. 
Identifying psychological rules 
 In humans, the presence of prosocial behaviour in response to specific stimuli 
can be shown with so-called “titration experiments”, by keeping all other stimuli 
constant and only changing the one of interest. For instance, dictator games, in which 
a dictator can allocate any amount of received money to a potential recipient, can be 
played under varying conditions, e.g. including subtle cues of being watched (Haley 
& Fessler 2005; Rigdon et al. 2009). The increase in contribution when a dictator 
feels observed allows us to conclude that they are sensitive to having an audience, 
even though this sensitivity may be entirely subconscious. 
A prosocial act in the absence of extrinsic stimuli may be called proactive 
prosociality (b in Figure 1). This is more controversial, since the notion that all 
extrinsic stimuli can be excluded in controlled experiments can be questioned (e.g. 
Bardsley 2008; Trivers 2006). Thus, it may be safer to assume that experiments take 
place at 0’ rather than 0 (see Figure 1), where extrinsic stimuli have been excluded or 
controlled for as much as possible, but some residual stimuli may remain. Hence there 
may be a grey area where prosocial acts can be either provoked by a high intrinsic 
motivation and/or a very strong response to subtle stimuli (high a in Figure 1). In 
particular, in the case of an audience, the awareness of the risk of detection may be so 
strong that actors respond prosocially to subtle cues of being watched or just the idea 
of being watched. In this view, conscience thus functions to anticipate reactions by a 
potential audience (DeScioli & Kurzban 2009; Trivers 1971). Similarly, in the case of 
need, actors could respond to just the slightest signs of need in a potential recipient if 
their theory of mind capacities are well developed, or they could respond to the idea 
of the recipient being in need. If this is the case, many humans may never actually 
reach 0 level, i.e. no experimental setting can exclude all social influences and make 
actors decide out of purely selfish considerations (Trivers 2006). 
Among animals, and in particular non-human primates, similar experimental 
approaches have been followed. Provisioning experiments were often designed to 
reflect economic games played with humans, and have mainly focused on proactive 
prosociality. A fundamental constraint on them is that they cannot be played 
anonymously, but nonetheless, if prosocial behaviour occurs in the absence of or 
regardless of any measurable stimuli from the recipients, the plausible conclusion 
would be to infer a high intrinsic motivation (b), or a very high sensitivity to residual 
stimuli (a). Other experiments investigated prosocial acts in response to signs or 
signals of need, such as so-called targeted helping experiments. Table 1 gives an 
overview over the types of experiments we discuss below, as well as their main 
findings. In all these experiments, one should be aware of the risk of false positives or 
false negatives due to possible confounding effects on the subjects’ behaviour. This 
risk is especially high in experiments with low ecological validity, since they may not 
be understood by the subjects in the same way as conceived by the experimenters. 
Hence, one should examine the pattern of results as a whole, without over-
emphasising single studies, and validate them through consistency with the natural 
history. 
Another line of evidence we therefore examine is naturally occurring food 
sharing. Defined as the tolerated transfer of food from A (the owner) to B (the 
recipient), food sharing is a common form of prosocial behaviour among primates 
(Brown et al. 2004; Feistner & McGrew 1989; Rapaport & Brown 2008). However, 
food sharing is clearly not homogeneous among primates with respect to the 
underlying psychology. In most species transfers are mainly passive, even among kin, 
while in others food owners may actively promote transfers by “offering” (Feistner & 
McGrew 1989), thus showing stronger prosocial dispositions. Here we present a 
quantification of these ways in which food is transferred (Figure 2, see Supplementary 
Table 1 for operational definitions), focussing on the best-studied taxa: great apes, 
capuchins and callitrichids (see Supplementary Table 2 for complete list of species). 
In particular, we will discuss food offering, i.e. transfers initiated by the owner in the 
absence of begging, as reflecting proactive prosociality and active sharing upon 
begging as reflecting reactive prosociality, in response to signals of need. Tolerated 
taking or passive sharing, the most common form of food sharing among primates 
(Figure 2), is more ambiguous with regard to the underlying psychology since the lack 
of overt action could represent no prosocial response or an explicit absence of a 
negative response to the beggar. However, parsimony suggests that no overt action 
mostly reflects the absence of a psychological response. 
Evidence for psychological rules 
 This section summarizes empirical evidence for the proposed psychological 
rules underlying prosocial acts in humans and other primates. First, we examine 
reactive prosociality (1), in response to perceived need (a) or audience (b) and as 
modified by social distance to the recipient (c). Then we discuss the possibility of 
proactive prosociality (2), i.e. in the absence of extrinsic stimuli. In each subsection 
we first present the evidence on (i) humans and then (ii) on primates, as inferred from 
experimental evidence and food sharing. The primate evidence focuses on great apes 
as our closest living relatives, and in particular chimpanzees as the best studied 
species, but other species, in particular capuchin monkeys and callithrichid monkeys 
are mentioned throughout to illustrate parallels with humans. 
(insert Table 1 about here) 
1. Reactive prosociality 
a) Need 
 (i) Humans routinely respond with prosocial acts to the need of the recipient as 
signalled by the latter, e.g. through an outstretched hand in a begging gesture and/or 
vocalizations, and start doing so at young ages (Brownell et al. 2009; Eisenberg & 
Mussen 1989). This is illustrated by the frequent reactive food sharing of young 
children (Figure 2). The underlying motivation is probably empathy or sympathy 
(Eisenberg & Mussen 1989; Silk 2007; Trivers 1971); de Waal & Suchak, this 
volume). Furthermore, even in the absence of explicit signals of need (in the form of a 
directed solicitation), an actor can respond to signs of need. For instance, if an 
individual is trying to reach an object, an actor may respond by retrieving and handing 
over the object (Warneken & Tomasello 2006). Note that the correct interpretation of 
such signs of need depends on specific theory of mind capacities particularly well 
developed in humans (Burkart et al. 2009), which may explain why in children 
helping is elicited faster and in a broader range of contexts than in chimpanzees 
(Warneken et al. 2007; Warneken & Tomasello 2006). 
(ii) Among great apes, and in particular chimpanzees, signals of need can be 
seen in solicitation of grooming (Pika & Mitani 2006), of agonistic support (de Waal 
1982), or of food. Begging for food may sometimes elicit reactive sharing, but most 
often there is no overt response and food is shared passively (if at all), suggesting a 
low sensitivity to need (Figure 2). Indeed, reactive sharing may often serve to get rid 
of the beggar, even the actor’s own offspring, by giving scraps while withholding 
more valuable food (Bard 1992; Kuroda 1984; Ueno & Matsuzawa 2004), thus 
reflecting selfishness rather than prosociality. However, among adults, and in 
particular chimpanzee males, reactive sharing is somewhat more common (Figure 2) 
and may sometimes include large quantities of meat (Boesch & Boesch 1989; D. 
Watts pers.comm.), suggesting higher sharing motivation.  
Great apes, especially chimpanzees, are known to have relatively well-
developed theory of mind capacities (Call & Tomasello 2008) and could thus be 
expected to read and respond to recipient need. Yet, crucially, signs of need, such as 
approaching and peering at a food owner without begging hardly ever leads to sharing 
(Jaeggi et al. 2010b; Jaeggi et al. 2008; Kuroda 1984), suggesting that explicit signals 
are required for a prosocial response. 
We now turn to the experimental evidence. Begging did not induce food 
donation in provisioning games among chimpanzees (Jensen et al. 2006; Silk et al. 
2005), which may reflect low sensitivity to these signals if they are not made in 
immediate proximity. However, helping behaviour in response to explicit signals of 
need has been reported for chimpanzees (Warneken et al. 2007; Warneken & 
Tomasello 2006; Yamamoto et al. 2009) and capuchin monkeys (Barnes et al. 2008) 
in targeted helping experiments (Table 1). Crucially, signs of need such as struggling 
to solve a task (Yamamoto et al. 2009) or reaching for an object without calling the 
subjects name (Warneken et al. 2007) mostly did not induce helping in chimpanzees, 
unless they were well enculturated by humans (Warneken & Tomasello 2006).  
Cooperative breeders, such as callitrichids and social carnivores may use 
signals of need in the form of specific begging calls which usually increase begging 
success (Brown et al. 2004; Feistner & McGrew 1989; Kühme 1965; Manser & Avey 
2000; Mech et al. 1999). There is also good experimental evidence that the response 
to these vocalizations are adjusted to the beggar’s skill level (Humle & Snowdon 
2008; Thornton & McAuliffe 2006). Signs of need (reaching) also did not induce a 
prosocial response in callithrichids (Burkart et al. 2007; Cronin et al. 2009). Thus, 
cooperative breeders generally show reactive prosociality to signals of need, but not 
to signs of need. 
Taken together, the most striking result is not the response to signals of need, 
but rather its often reluctant nature or even absence in many species, in particular in 
the food-sharing context (Figure 2, Supplementary Table 2), as well as the 
unresponsiveness to signs of need. These findings and the fact that, at least among 
chimpanzees, theory of mind capacities are better developed in competitive rather 
than cooperative situations (Hare & Tomasello 2004) suggest that in this species 
prosocial responses to signals and signs of need have not been under the same positive 
selection as in humans, i.e. that the slope a in Figure 1 is shallower. 
b) Audience 
 (i) The (perceived) presence and size of an audience can increase prosocial 
behaviour among humans in natural situations (Smith & Bliege Bird 2005) as well as 
in various experiments, where subtle eye cues or actual audiences increased 
contributions in dictator games (Haley & Fessler 2005; Marlowe 2004; Rigdon et al. 
2009), public goods games (Bateson et al. 2006; Burnham & Hare 2007; Milinski et 
al. 2002) and trust games (Fehr & Schneider 2010). This adjustment to a potential 
audience may be largely unconscious (cf. Bateson et al. 2006). Finally, the fact that 
some of the effects are entirely driven by men (e.g. Rigdon et al. 2009) may indicate 
costly signalling while the response to more explicit reputation incentives (e.g. Fehr & 
Schneider 2010) may indicate a general concern for reputation. 
(ii) Among animals, sensitivity to presence of an audience is expected when 
individuals have to maintain a cooperative reputation or advertise their own qualities 
in the face of considerable partner choice. While this has been nicely shown in fish 
(Bshary & Grutter 2006), only anecdotal observations suggest that chimpanzee males 
rising in rank may use food sharing to signal generosity to the whole group (de Waal 
1982). The number of beggars positively affects the amount of food shared among 
chimpanzees and bonobos (Fruth & Hohmann 2002; Gilby 2006), but this has been 
interpreted as reflecting increased harassment rather than signalling generosity. So far, 
no controlled experiments have been done to investigate the role of an audience on 
prosocial behaviour. 
A precondition for audience effects on cooperative behaviour is that the 
potential audience actually attends to interactions between others and uses this 
information to build reputations. There is much evidence that animals eavesdrop on 
others’ interactions (e.g. Bshary & Grutter 2006), but amongst primates 
eavesdropping mainly concerns dominance interactions (Bergman et al. 2003) or 
sexual behaviour (Crockford et al. 2007) rather than prosocial acts (see Earley, this 
volume). Recent experiments have shown that chimpanzees, but not capuchins 
(Brosnan & de Waal 2009), can learn to distinguish between a prosocial and a selfish 
human experimenter (Russell et al. 2008; Subiaul et al. 2008), suggesting that the 
audience can build prosocial reputations. However, as noted above, no experiments 
have tested whether actors respond to a greater number of observers with more 
prosociality. Furthermore, there is hardly any evidence that non-cooperative 
behaviour is punished by others (Jensen; this volume). Thus, more studies are clearly 
needed to investigate audience effects in nonhuman primates in the context of 
prosociality. 
c) Social distance 
 (i) In humans, all other things being equal, partners with whom the actor has a 
strong affiliative bond based on either kinship or friendship can elicit more prosocial 
acts than enemies or neutral persons (e.g. Birch & Billman 1986; Eisenberg & 
Mussen 1989; Majolo et al. 2006) and in-group members are favoured over out-group 
members (Fehr et al. 2008; Goette et al. 2006). There is also clear evidence that these 
prosocial acts are further influenced by the recent history of interactions, taking e.g. 
indebtedness into account (e.g. Eisenberg & Mussen 1989). The underlying emotions 
here are probably feelings of gratitude or guilt (Trivers 1971), which can thus have 
short-term effects on perceived social distance. 
(ii) Many animals have some way of recognizing or preferentially interacting 
with their close kin if they have the opportunity to do so (Chapais 2006; Silk 2006). 
Furthermore, unrelated individuals in many species of primates form long-term social 
bonds, called friendships (Silk 2002), characterized by reciprocal exchange of 
grooming and other social commodities such as coalitionary support or food sharing 
(Brown et al. 2004; Jaeggi & van Schaik in review; Schino 2007; Schino & Aureli 
2008; Schino & Aureli 2009). Hence, there is a clear preference among primates to 
direct prosocial acts to kin or reciprocating partners (friends). The recent history of 
interactions, i.e. indebtedness, may also sometimes be taken into account (e.g. de 
Waal 1997; de Waal 2000; Hemelrijk 1994). 
 Nonetheless, controlled experiments in which subjects were given a choice to 
act prosocially towards a relative, friend or a neutral partner were largely 
inconclusive. Chimpanzees did not provide more food to kin than to non-kin (Jensen 
et al. 2006; Yamamoto & Tanaka 2010) and neither did macaques (Schaub 1996). 
Only capuchin monkeys differentiated between kin, familiar and unfamiliar partners 
(de Waal et al. 2008). Thus, even though natural observations clearly indicate partner 
specificity in prosociality, as predicted by kin selection or reciprocity, many 
provisioning experiments surprisingly indicated a complete absence of prosociality. 
This may again indicate that prosocial acts among many primates, even to relatives or 
friends, need to be elicited by immediate and salient stimuli, such as continuous 
begging (cf. Yamamoto & Tanaka 2009b), which was not possible in these 
experiments. This notion is supported by the fact that among most primates virtually 
all food sharing, even with infants, is in response to begging (Figure 2, Supplementary 
Table 2). 
(insert Figure 2 about here) 
2. Proactive prosociality 
(i) Proactive sharing or helping occurs in experiments with human children 
(Birch & Billman 1986; Rao & Stewart 1999; Warneken & Tomasello 2006), but it is 
difficult to exclude possible signs or signals of need in these paradigms. In one-shot 
dictator games in which anonymity and large social distance are ensured as much as 
possible and the need of the recipient is unknown, the average contributions are 
always above zero (although many players actually do give zero), indicating that at 
least a subset of individuals is prosocial in the absence of any stimuli (see Camerer 
2003, Table 2.3 for a compilation of various studies). These experiments thus led to 
the conclusion that humans are at least occasionally motivated by other-regarding 
preferences (Camerer 2003). 
(ii) Among non-human primates, proactive prosociality can be seen in food 
offering, i.e. when food owners initiate sharing in the absence of begging or other 
signs of interest by the recipient (Feistner & McGrew 1989). Offering has been 
reported occasionally for a number of species (see Figure 2, Supplementary Table 2 
for species not in the figure). However, regular offering is only seen among 
callitrichids, where parents and helpers give specific food calls to invite transfers to 
the infants (Figure 2). This indicates a strong motivation to share and suppression of 
own feeding motivations among callitrichids, which is further supported by the facts 
that preferred food is more likely to be offered (Feistner & Chamove 1986; Ferrari 
1987), animals offer more when infants are out of sight (e.g. Ferrari 1987; contrary to 
capuchins: de Waal et al. 2008), and they offer food to other adults (Rapaport 2001) 
or even to infants of different species (Feistner & Price 1999). This strong sharing 
motivation among callitrichids is in line with the high motivation to carry infants 
(Hrdy 2009), despite the substantial cost associated with it (Schradin & Anzenberger 
2001). Non-primate cooperative breeders may show similarly high motivations to 
help and share (Clutton-Brock et al. 2001; Kühme 1965). 
Since proactive prosociality has been claimed for humans mainly on the basis 
of non-zero contributions in dictator games (Camerer 2003), similar games have been 
designed to test primates (see provisioning games in Table 1). In chimpanzees, four 
studies did not find any evidence for proactive prosociality, even in mother-offspring 
dyads (Jensen et al. 2006; Silk et al. 2005; Vonk et al. 2008; Yamamoto & Tanaka 
2010). In macaques there was also hardly any evidence for prosociality in 
provisioning games (Colman et al. 1969; Mason & Hollis 1962; Schaub 1996). (A 
recent study did report provisioning from dominants to subordinates (Massen et al. 
2010). However, it did not find sharing in the opposite direction, and the experimental 
set-up did not rule out the simpler explanation that dominants prefer to sit close to 
subordinates (e.g. so as to induce being groomed), whereas the latter avoid the former 
(to avoid aggression). Furthermore, generous behaviour by dominants is in stark 
contrast to the natural history of this despotic species, where most grooming is 
directed up the hierarchy (Schino & Aureli 2008) and food sharing is virtually absent 
(Jaeggi & van Schaik in review). Hence the null model of no proactive prosociality is 
not convincingly rejected). In capuchin monkeys, mainly positive evidence has been 
reported (de Waal et al. 2008; Lakshminarayanan & Santos 2008; Takimoto et al. 
2010). In callitrichids, some studies report positive evidence for common marmosets 
(Burkart et al. 2007) and cotton-top tamarins (Hauser et al. 2003; Cronin et al. in 
rev.), but others do not (Cronin et al. 2009; Stevens 2010). Because the positive 
evidence is less easily explained away and here is consistent with the natural history, 
the preliminary conclusion that callitrichids show proactive prosociality seems 
warranted. 
A high intrinsic motivation to act prosocially may also be expressed in so-
called unilateral cooperation games (Table 1), in which only one of two individuals is 
rewarded for a task solved by both. In these games, cooperation tends to break down 
among chimpanzees (reviewed by Warneken & Tomasello 2009). Among capuchins, 
unilateral cooperation works if the role of recipient is alternated (de Waal & Berger 
2000; Hattori et al. 2005), allowing for immediate reciprocation. Among tamarins, in 
contrast, it is sustained over long periods without alteration of rewards or signals of 
need (Cronin & Snowdon 2008). Thus, a high intrinsic prosocial motivation 
apparently allows them to keep cooperation going in the absence of immediate 
rewards. 
Discussion 
Methodological issues 
 Before drawing conclusions from the evidence reviewed above it is important 
to eliminate potential confounding effects. In particular, we discuss the possibilities 
that primates may be more prosocial in non-food vs. food tasks and that rearing and 
housing conditions may affect levels of prosociality. 
Firstly, it has been suggested that prosociality is more pronounced in non-food 
contexts (e.g. de Waal et al. 2008; Warneken & Tomasello 2009; Yamamoto & 
Tanaka 2009b) perhaps due to an obsession with food and the associated lack of 
inhibitory control in provisioning experiments. The evidence for non-food 
prosociality among chimpanzees includes targeted helping (Table 1) as well as other 
contexts such as adoption of orphans (Boesch et al. 2010). However, in these contexts 
prosociality is also mainly reactive, thus not contradicting the main findings here. 
Furthermore, tool sharing by great ape mothers, a non-food context, seems to be 
equally reactive as food sharing, happening virtually only upon request by the infant 
(Hirata & Celli 2003; Lonsdorf 2006; C. Sanz et al. in prep.; cf. Figure 2). Hence, the 
psychological regulation of prosociality seems similar in food or non-food contexts. 
 Secondly, rearing and housing conditions may affect subjects’ performance in 
experiments (Boesch 2007). For instance, the degree of enculturation, through hand-
rearing or daily interactions with animal keepers is likely to affect subjects’ 
psychology. In particular, since many prosociality paradigms reflect typical human 
interactions, sometimes with little ecological validity for the primates, enculturated 
individuals are more likely to grasp the idea of the paradigm. For instance, the 
subjects of Warneken et al. (2007) were housed in the chimpanzee sanctuary of 
Ngamba Island, where the chimpanzees receive their daily food in bowls which they 
have to actively hand to the keepers. This may well have influenced their performance 
in a very similar experiment in which they had to retrieve an object and hand it to a 
human experimenter (ibid.). This is not to say that the experimental results are flawed, 
but they may reflect the species’ potential rather than species-typical behaviour. Thus, 
if enculturated chimpanzees can learn to be more prosocial, the conditions under 
which this is the case may help explain how our own species came to evolve in this 
direction, but it need not necessarily inform us about chimpanzee-typical prosociality.  
Reconstructing the evolution of human prosociality 
Despite these uncertainties, some general conclusions about similarities and 
differences in the psychological regulation of prosociality in the best-studied species 
can be drawn. These are summarized in Table 2. We infer the presence of three 
components with different evolutionary histories: one shared with other apes, 
especially chimpanzees, a second acquired due to the adoption of cooperative 
breeding and probably shared with other cooperative breeders, and a third one 
acquired uniquely due to living in large, fission-fusion societies with high 
interdependence amongst individuals. 
(insert Table 2 about here) 
Humans are both regularly proactively prosocial, thus reflecting a high 
intrinsic prosocial motivation, and highly responsive to extrinsic stimuli. 
Chimpanzees, in contrast, are hardly ever proactively prosocial and their reactive 
prosociality generally depends on salient and immediate signals of need such as 
continuous solicitations (cf. Yamamoto & Tanaka 2009b). This agrees with the notion 
that chimpanzee cooperation among adults mainly rests on direct reciprocity, which is 
clearly indicated by the presence of long-term social bonds (friendships, Silk 2002) 
within which favours are exchanged symmetrically (e.g. Mitani 2006; Watts 2002) 
and by the low average relatedness within these cooperative relationships 
(Langergraber et al. 2007; Langergraber et al. 2009). Hence chimpanzees are a good 
example for both the scope and limits of cooperation based on direct reciprocity: The 
establishment of long-term friendships and the corresponding attachment allows 
chimpanzees to engage in various forms of cooperation such as cooperative hunting 
(Boesch 1994; Boesch & Boesch 1989), agonistic support (e.g. Mitani 2006; Watts 
2002) and collective warfare (Manson & Wrangham 1991). Thus, prosocial acts are 
particularly common among males, who profit most from cooperation (Boesch & 
Boesch 1989; Nishida et al. 1992; Watts 2002). On the other hand, cooperation is 
subject to opportunistic fluctuations (de Waal 1982; Gilby et al. 2009) and in 
experiments has difficulty getting started (Brosnan & Beran 2009; Brosnan et al. 
2009; Yamamoto & Tanaka 2009a) or tends to break down in the absence of 
immediate rewards (reviewed by Warneken & Tomasello 2009) or explicit 
solicitations (Yamamoto & Tanaka 2009b). These difficulties of experimental 
reciprocity may further indicate that reciprocity among chimpanzees (and indeed most 
animals) is mainly symmetry-based rather than calculated (Brosnan & de Waal 2002), 
i.e. prosocial acts are averaged out on a long-term basis mediated by affiliative 
emotions rather than exchanged contingently in a tit-for-tat manner requiring 
substantial cognitive effort (Stevens & Hauser 2004; see discussion by Brosnan et al. 
this volume). While it is parsimonious to assume that human ancestors shared these 
aspects of cooperation based on direct reciprocity with chimpanzees, humans seem to 
have acquired several derived features, some of which may have evolved 
convergently with other taxa. These derived features combined to make human 
cooperation more stable relative to chimpanzees. 
The regular proactive element of human prosociality almost certainly shared 
with callitrichids suggests that a high intrinsic prosocial motivation evolved 
convergently in cooperative breeders, probably because of the risk of neglect of 
unattended offspring (Burkart & van Schaik 2010; Hrdy 2009), and the need for 
active provisioning to maintain fast growth levels (Brown et al. 2004; Gurven & Hill 
2009). This proactive element could also explain why teaching is more common 
among cooperative breeders (Burkart & van Schaik 2010; Rapaport 2006; Rapaport & 
Brown 2008) whereas great apes often do not take advantage of low-cost 
opportunities to teach (Hirata & Celli 2003; Jaeggi et al. 2010a; Lonsdorf 2006; C. 
Sanz et al. in prep.). Furthermore, the adoption of cooperative breeding typically leads 
to the formation of family units, within which prosocial acts are dispensed more freely 
because they generally benefit close kin or pair-bonded partners (Burkart & van 
Schaik 2010; Chapais 2008; Hrdy 2009). Thus a high intrinsic prosocial motivation 
would not be counter-selected if applied within the family. Finally, within human 
societies kin networks extend far beyond the family unit (Chapais 2008), and even 
when applied to non-relatives, a high prosocial motivation may be beneficial if it 
sends a costly signal or serves to maintain one’s good reputation (see below). 
Capuchin monkeys may on the face of it not fit this picture. One could argue 
that the more stable group composition relative to chimpanzees, as well as increased 
paternity concentration and female philopatry (Fragaszy et al. 2004) could have led to 
more stable reciprocal relationships and higher average relatedness, thus favouring 
prosocial motivations. However, the same is true for most macaques, probably 
without increasing prosociality. Another explanation could be that capuchins also 
evolved higher prosocial motivations, because they, like many New World Monkeys, 
engage in allo-maternal care, such as infant carrying and regular food sharing from 
males to infants (ibid.). At the moment, no other convincing hypotheses exist for the 
taxonomic distribution of the components of prosociality among primates. 
Finally, humans seem to have acquired a strong sensitivity to the (perceived) 
presence and size of an audience. There are two explanations for this. Firstly, the 
potentially high costs imposed on cheaters in a society of interdependent individuals 
(Boehm 1999; Gurven 2004; Kaplan et al. 2009; Marlowe 2009), which we have 
internalized as “conscience”,  functioning to anticipate others’ reactions (DeScioli & 
Kurzban 2009; Trivers 1971), have lead to an increase in prosocial behaviour in the 
presence of subtle cues of being watched. Secondly, individuals (mainly men) may 
send costly signals in the presence of large audiences, thus advertising themselves as 
valuable cooperation partners or mates (Smith & Bliege Bird 2005). This new 
sensitivity to being watched and to the size of the audience may lead to strong 
reactive prosociality, in the presence of subtle extrinsic stimuli (0’), or even to 
proactive prosociality, if the conscience effectively internalized the possibility that 
extrinsic stimuli are present (0). Finally, the recent rise of anonymous market societies 
with their need for larger-scale cooperation may have further modified psychology 
(Henrich et al. 2010). 
In conclusion, we note that humans differ from their closest living relatives, 
the great apes, in two key aspects of the psychological regulation of cooperation: 
Humans are proactive, i.e. they act prosocial in the absence of obvious extrinsic 
stimuli and more reactive, i.e. they respond stronger to extrinsic stimuli and to a wider 
range of such stimuli. Thus, the parameters a (response to extrinsic stimuli) and b 
(intrinsic motivation) in Figure 1 differ between humans and great apes, indicating 
that prosociality has been under stronger positive selection during human evolution. 
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Tables 
TABLE 1: Summary of experimental outcomes measuring prosocial tendencies in 
primates 
Paradigm Chimpanzees Macaques Capuchins Callitrichids 
Provisioning 
games 
Negative1,2,3,4 
 
Positive10, 
negative11-13
Positive14-16  Positive20-22 
Negative23,24 
 
Unilateral 
cooperation 
Tends to break 
down5,6 
 Reciprocal17,18 
 
Reciprocal25 
Sustained26 
Targeted 
helping 
Positive7-9 
 
 Positive19 
 
 
1,2,3(Jensen et al. 2006; Silk et al. 2005; Vonk et al. 2008; Yamamoto & Tanaka 2010), 
5,6(reviewed by Snowdon & Cronin 2007; Warneken & Tomasello 2009), 7-
9(Warneken et al. 2007; Warneken & Tomasello 2006; Yamamoto et al. 2009), 10(but 
no control for simpler explanations: Massen et al. 2010), 11-13(Colman et al. 1969; 
Mason & Hollis 1962; Schaub 1996), 14-16(de Waal et al. 2008; Lakshminarayanan & 
Santos 2008; Takimoto et al. 2010), 17,18(de Waal & Berger 2000; Hattori et al. 2005), 
19(Barnes et al. 2008), 20-22(Burkart et al. 2007; Cronin et al., in rev.; Hauser et al. 
2003b), 23,24(Cronin et al. 2009; Stevens 2010), 25(Hauser et al. 2003a), 26(Cronin & 
Snowdon 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Summary of the main findings regarding the proximate regulation of 
prosocial acts in the best studied species 
Rule Humans Chimpanzees Capuchins Callitrichids Evoluationary 
status 
Needa ++ 
(signs and 
signals)e 
+ 
(signals) 
+ 
(signals) 
+ 
(signals) 
homologous 
Audienceb ++ (-) (-) (-) uniquely 
derived 
Social distancec ++ + ++ + homologous 
Proactived ++ -- + ++ convergence 
a-c Do actors adjust prosociality to a the perceived need of the recipient, b the perceived 
presence and size of an audience, or c the social distance to the recipient? 
d Do prosocial acts occur in the absence of obvious extrinsic stimuli, thus reflecting a 
high intrinsic prosocial motivation? 
e Signs of need by the recipient, such as reaching for an object or struggling with a 
task, are not directed at the actor and probably require some theory of mind capacities 
to be correctly read; signals of need, such as begging or calling, on the other hand are 
explicitly directed at the actor and evolved in a form most successful at eliciting a 
response 
++ regular in experimental and natural context; + regular in at least one context; -- 
absent in both contexts; (-) possibly absent but no controlled experiments (cf. Table 1, 
Figure 2, text) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure legends 
Figure 1: Prosocial behaviour as a function of extrinsic stimulus strength and intrinsic 
prosocial motivation. In humans, these stimuli can be perceived need of the recipient 
and/or the perceived presence and size of an audience. Social distance to the partner 
further modifies the prosocial response, i.e. at a given point xi, kin, reciprocating 
partners or in-group members will generally elicit a higher prosocial response. Thus, 
prosocial behaviour in response to these stimuli may be called reactive. Eventually, 
the response will reach ceiling levels, as indicated by the dashed curve. If the intrinsic 
motivation b is greater than zero, prosocial behaviour may occur even in the absence 
of such stimuli and can thus be called proactive. However, since in practice it may be 
impossible to exclude all extrinsic stimuli, experiments trying to do so may measure 
prosociality at 0’ rather than 0 and proactive thus refers to either a high intrinsic 
motivation or a high sensitivity to the remaining stimuli, as indicated by the dashed 
lines leading to 0. Ultimately, natural selection can work by changing the sensitivity 
to stimuli, a, and/or the intrinsic motivation, b, depending on the average certainty of 
return benefits to the actor. Humans have probably acquired a greater intrinsic 
prosocial motivation, as well as a higher response to extrinsic stimuli since their 
divergence from great apes 
Figure 2: Percentages of all tolerated food transfers among different primate species 
in which the owner shared proactively (offering) or reactively (active giving or 
facilitated taking upon begging). The remaining transfers were passive (tolerated 
taking). See Supplementary Tables S1 for operational definitions and S2 for a full 
reference list including additional species. Bars represent means of different studies, 
i.e. the percentage of each type of transfer from each study, or independent study 
group is counted as one data point. The numbers above the bars indicate the number 
of independent data points contributing to these means. Inf.= sharing with infants, 
ad.= sharing among adults 
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